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Introduction
In the thirty years since the publication of Ronald Dworkinʼs “What is 
Equality” (1981) luck, choice, and responsibility have come to the fore in 
philosophical discussion of distributive justice. Luck egalitarianism, which 
aims to reduce or eliminate the effects of luck, making distributions sensitive 
to individual responsibility, has been a particular focus of the debate (see 
Arneson 1989; Cohen 1989). Over a similar time period health and healthcare 
have come to be a major area of application for theories of distributive justice, 
most notably in Norman Daniels  ʼ(1985, 2008) Rawlsian approach to health 
and healthcare based on a fair equality of opportunity principle (FEOP). It 
is overdue, then, for these two important developments to be brought into 
contact in systematic fashion. This is precisely what Shlomi Segallʼs Health, 
Luck, and Justice sets out to do, with considerable success.
The book is arranged into three parts. The first part focuses on healthcare, 
the second part on health ʻproperʼ, while the third and by far the shortest 
part focuses on the connection between political borders and distribution of 
health and healthcare. In addition to the usual introduction and conclusion 
there is an opening chapter that stands apart, as it were, setting out “a working 
definition of the theory of justice to be employed throughout the rest of the 
book” (2). Although, like all eleven chapters, relatively brief, the chapter 
contains discussion of two neglected but significant topics in the definition 
of luck egalitarianism, and deserves special attention. This chapter will be 
the focus of the first two sections. I move on to consider Segallʼs treatment 
I am most grateful to Shlomi Segall for detailed comments on an earlier draft of this 
review.
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of just healthcare in the third section; considerations of space prohibit giving 
the second half of the book the attention it deserves, though some of the 
arguments there are briefly mentioned. While I primarily focus on points 
of disagreement with Segall, I hope it is clear throughout how much I have 
gained from reading what is a thoroughly researched, timely, and insightful 
book. 
Inequality
Segall proposes that the following formulation captures “the proper luck 
egalitarian sentiment”:
It is unjust for individuals to be worse off than others due to outcomes that it would 
have been unreasonable to expect them to avoid. (13)
This departs from the standard understanding of luck egalitarianism in two 
ways: I consider the first in this section, and the second in the next section. 
First, then, it makes it a necessary condition for injustice that an inequality 
is present. If no inequality is present, no individual is worse off than others, 
so there can be no injustice on Segallʼs formulation. By contrast, the usual 
luck egalitarian position is that even equalities can be unjust where they have 
come about in a certain way. 
I had barely considered the view that equalities and inequalities should be 
treated asymmetrically in the way Segall suggests, so I was surprised to find 
that well-known statements of luck egalitarianism suggest this position. Segall 
cites Larry Temkin and the influential critic Susan Hurley on this score, but 
even Richard Arneson and G. A. Cohen, who Segall cites as adherents of the 
symmetrical view (14–15), sometimes appear to advocate the asymmetrical 
view. Arneson (1990, 177) writes that his “ideal of equal opportunity for 
welfare is roughly that other things equal, it is morally wrong if some people 
are worse off than others through no fault or voluntary choice of their own,” 
without saying that it is, ceteris paribus, morally wrong if some people are 
as well off as others in spite of making much more prudentially or morally 
sound choices (see also Arneson 1989, 85). Similarly, Cohen (1989, 916) 
writes that “what currently strikes me as the right reading of egalitarianism 
[is] that its purpose is to eliminate involuntary disadvantage, by which I 
(stipulatively) mean disadvantage for which the sufferer cannot be held 
responsible, since it does not appropriately reflect choices that he has made 
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or is making or would make.” There is no mention here of the elimination 
of involuntary equality. While there is ample evidence that Arnesonʼs and 
Cohenʼs settled positions do not require inequality for redistribution to be 
appropriate, Segall has done political philosophers, including myself (see 
Knight 2009, 1), a service in encouraging us to think harder about our 
statements of luck egalitarianism.
It is a different issue whether we should accept the first part of the 
reformulation of luck egalitarianism. Segall suggests that this is appropriate 
as the standard view which treats equality and inequality symmetrically is 
better understood as a kind of desert view (16–18). It seems clear that a 
desert-sensitive account of justice will require that, where two individuals 
are differentially deserving, an equal outcome is an unjust outcome. But I do 
not see how the standard luck egalitarian view can be thought of as a kind 
of desert view. Arneson (1989, 84) is especially explicit that “there need be 
no grounds for finding fault with any aims or actions” of any individuals 
who lose out under luck egalitarianism. A luck egalitarian who bases 
distributions on the outcomes of voluntary actions may be willing to concede 
that two individuals are equally deserving – have made decisions that are 
equally good from a moral or prudential perspective, say – yet insist that, 
as one individualʼs decisions have (undeservedly) worked out better, he is 
entitled to a greater distributive share. Cases such as this, where option luck 
shapes the consequences of actions, show that it is a misunderstanding of 
conventional luck egalitarianism to equate it with desert. Unless a particular 
form of luck egalitarianism states otherwise (Arneson 2011 mentions such a 
view), it will distribute in a way that ignores the moral or prudential desert 
of individuals.
One objection to Segallʼs proposal supposes that “Jack and Jill occupy 
identical positions in a firm, but where Jill puts in twice as many hours (and, 
accordingly, let us also assume, produces twice as much output). Yet, at the 
end of the month Jack and Jill receive an identical pay check” (18). Against 
the suggestion that an injustice has occurred here, Segall notes, fairly, that 
there may be no wrong here were it the case that these terms were known 
in advance, as in a Kibbutz. But what about the more difficult case, where 
such terms are not known in advance? Here Segall urges that “if the state of 
affairs (her [Jill] getting as much as Jack despite working harder) is unjust, 
it is so because she has been discriminated against, or because her legitimate 
expectations have been frustrated” (19). On Segallʼs view, then, it is this 
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discrimination which is constitutive of the injustice of the case, and the 
equality itself is “only potentially indicative of it.”
I do not believe that this defence succeeds. To see this we need simply 
change the case so that Jill and Jack work equally hard, but this time Jack 
is given a much larger paycheck than Jill. If it is true that the previous 
caseʼs equality is only indicative of injustice (in the form of discrimination 
or frustration of legitimate expectation), rather than itself unjust, then it is 
true that the new caseʼs inequality is also merely indicative of injustice, 
rather than being itself unjust. But the inequality in the new case is patently 
unjust according to luck egalitarianism, as it is an inequality deriving from 
identical exercises of responsibility. The fact that it has come about as a 
result of discrimination merely proves that Jill has suffered brute bad luck, 
and is entitled to redress. Similarly, in the original case, the fact that the 
equality is generated by unjust discrimination does not somehow prevent it 
from being a matter of bad brute luck for Jill. To maintain the view that this 
equality does not need redress because it derived from discrimination one 
would, for the sake of consistency, have to maintain that inequalities derived 
from discrimination did not need redress, and that is something that no luck 
egalitarian (including Segall) can allow.
An objection to Segallʼs position which lacks the distracting involvement 
of discrimination can be made by revising a well known example from Will 
Kymlicka (1990, chap. 3). Suppose that two people of identical initial talents 
and resources make very different choices. One works hard planting and 
tending vegetables, in the reasonable expectation that they will be able to 
sell them at market for a good price, while the other spends all day playing 
tennis. Within a year, the gardener has a valuable crop which, once sold, will 
make his welfare level much higher than the tennis player. Now suppose 
that some wholly unforeseeable catastrophe befalls the gardener. Perhaps 
his crop – specially selected for its resistance to all known diseases – is 
devastated by a new and particularly virulent strain. Furthermore, this same 
disease destroys the weeds that have recently been making the tennis court 
next door unplayable, and so through sheer luck the tennis playerʼs welfare 
level increases at the same time as the gardenerʼs decreases, so that they will 
have identical welfare levels for the foreseeable future. 
I submit that egalitarian justice requires that we redistribute from the 
tennis player to the gardener, and that it is a powerful objection to the idea 
that inequality is a necessary condition for egalitarian redistribution that such 
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a condition precludes a transfer to the spectacularly unfortunate gardener 
from the lucky tennis fanatic. In refusing such redistribution, Segall allows 
distributions to be much more dependent on brute luck than the core intuitions 
of luck egalitarianism permit. Indeed, I would argue, as Kymlicka (1990, 74) 
and Cohen (1989, 911) do, that giving people like the gardener only as much 
as people like the tennis player amounts to treating them unequally, given the 
morally significant difference in their actions.
Segallʼs position actually contradicts core luck egalitarian ideas even 
prior to the tragedy which befalls the gardener. It is actually indifferent to the 
inequality which stood between the gardener and tennis player, and believes 
that the brute luck–generated inequality which followed it is just as good 
from the perspective of justice. So the problem is not just how the position 
handles a case where a brute luck equality is already present, but rather how 
it handles any case: it is just as likely to upset an inequality resulting from 
option luck as it is to keep it in place.
The position is, then, indeterminate in many cases. The only place where 
it will prescribe a specific outcome is where either equality or option luck 
inequality is impossible: wherever both are possible, it offers no guidance 
as to which we should prefer. Some might see this level of indeterminacy 
as a problem in itself, but it poses a special problem when combined with 
the luck egalitarian aversion to luck having an influence on distributions. 
Wherever equality or option luck inequality are possible, it will, for every 
individual, be a matter of brute good or bad luck whether the distribution of 
the two which favours them has been selected by the distributive agency. In 
one gardener/tennis player case equality might be chosen, and in another 
identical gardener/tennis player case option luck inequality might be chosen. 
This subjects the gardener in the first case to brute bad luck relative to the 
gardener in the second case, and the tennis player in the second case to brute 
bad luck relative to the gardener in the first case. This source of brute luck 
is not even present under outcome egalitarianism, which is determinate, so 
Segallʼs proposal violates luck egalitarian ideals in one way which even 
outcome egalitarianism does not.
There is a final objection to the proposal that inequality is a necessary 
condition for injustice which is, perhaps, the strongest of all. This is because 
it does not rely upon the idea that some inequalities are better than some 
equalities. Segall provides no criterion for distinguishing between equal 
distributions – for saying that one is more just, or less unjust, than the other. 
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This has the strongly counterintuitive result that we should be indifferent 
between an equality that results from brute luck and one which results from 
option luck. If we could intervene in the labour market, either to make 
all act like the tennis player, or to make all act like the gardener, with the 
distribution equal either way, Segallʼs view gives us no reason to prefer 
one intervention to the other. The view says, in effect, that, when it comes 
to equalities, making individual distributive shares proportional to what 
individuals have brought about, through their own decisions and toil, is no 
better a distributive criterion than tossing a coin. Even if one is committed to 
the view that egalitarians place a value on equality that cannot be overridden 
by responsibility considerations, as Segall is, one should still be able to use 
responsibility considerations as a tie-breaker, where equality is assured. As 
Segallʼs position does not even give responsibility this role, it amounts, in one 
regard, to a stronger rejection of brute luck neutralization than is necessitated 
by a commitment to equality.
The idea that inequality is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
redistribution is interesting and quite original. But given the objections 
presented above, relating to its refusal to endorse option luck inequalities, its 
introduction of a new kind of brute luck, and its refusal to prefer option luck 
equalities over brute luck equalities, it seems clear that it does not capture 
ʻthe proper luck egalitarian sentimentʼ. It is, rather, a halfway house between 
luck egalitarianism and outcome egalitarianism. That is not necessarily a 
bad thing, but the view is in need of a strong independent justification as it 
cannot rely on the arguments of luck egalitarians or outcome egalitarians. 
From the luck egalitarian side it can be asked: if we should neutralize brute 
luck when it results in inequalities, why shouldnʼt we neutralize it when 
it results in equalities? From the outcome egalitarian side it can be asked: 
if we think that equality is important enough that we should allow brute 
luck–created equalities to stand, why should we let option luck–created 
inequalities stand?
Avoidability
The second departure from standard definitions of luck egalitarianism 
concerns the issue of how distributions come about. Luck egalitarianism 
usually requires that an individual is agent responsible for bringing about some 
outcome, in order for that outcome to influence that individual sʼ distributive 
4 Knight layout.indd   77 12/23/10   11:40:11 AM
78   Carl Knight
share. Segall replaces this agent responsibility condition with a ʻreasonable 
avoidability  ʼcondition. Accordingly he treats brute luck not as the inverse 
of agent responsibility as on the standard view but rather as the “outcome of 
actions (including omissions) that it would have been unreasonable to expect 
the agent to avoid (or not to avoid, in the case of omissions)” (20).
This formulation is intended to deliver luck egalitarianism from several 
counterexamples that the standard, responsibility-focused form of luck 
egalitarianism has been subjected to, and to do so without violating the core 
ideas of luck egalitarianism. By these measures the formulation is a success. 
To take the latter measure first, there is a considerable degree of overlap 
between responsibility and reasonable avoidability. In many of the most 
intuitively significant cases, the presence of agent responsibility goes hand 
in hand with the presence of reasonable avoidability, and the absence of 
responsibility is accompanied by the absence of avoidability. For instance, 
where an individual is unproblematically agent responsible for gambling, 
it is likely also that they could have reasonably avoided the gamble. More 
clearly still, where an agent is clearly non-responsible for their disability, on 
account of it being congenital, it is also the case that the disability could not 
be reasonably avoided. Furthermore, while responsibility and avoidability 
come apart in some cases, itʼs not prima facie implausible that it is in just 
those cases that luck egalitarianism should abandon responsibility. Some 
odds are so good that it would be unreasonable to expect someone to turn 
them down, and it might still be fair to compensate the rational gambler when 
they have bad luck despite the fact they are responsible for accepting the 
odds. The literature certainly suggests that luck egalitarianism is not tightly 
bound to agent responsibility. Writers such as Dworkin (1981) and John 
Roemer (1993) have often been identified as luck egalitarians even though 
they do not base distributions on agent responsibility, and even theorists such 
as Arneson and Cohen who give responsibility a central role often describe 
their positions with terms such as control, choice, and fault, which are about 
as close to reasonable avoidability as they are to responsibility. Indeed, 
Cohen (1989, 908) comes close to Segallʼs suggestion when he writes that “a 
person . . . suffers from (bad) brute luck when his bad luck is not the result of 
a gamble or risk which he could have avoided.” In short, I do not think that 
Segallʼs second departure from traditional luck egalitarianism is inconsistent 
with the core luck egalitarian ideas in the way that his first departure – the 
asymmetrical treatment of equality and inequality – is.
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But why modify luck egalitarianism in this second way? One counter-
example that responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism has faced involves 
people who are responsible for living in areas that are known to suffer from 
a risk of earthquakes, and which are indeed struck by earthquakes (20–21). 
Another relates to women who are responsible for becoming pregnant, and 
so require medical treatment during the pregnancy and delivery. And others 
concern firefighters responsible for entering the burning building which 
injures them, and caregivers who are responsible for choosing to care for 
relatives at the cost of their careers and social lives (22–23). In all these 
cases, at least some readings of luck egalitarianism appear to harshly rule 
out socially-funded assistance as the people concerned are responsible for 
bringing about the need for assistance. But Segall notes that, in every case, it 
would have been unreasonable to expect the agents to have acted otherwise – 
to expect people to not live in certain parts of California on account of a 
small earthquake risk, to expect women not to become pregnant, to expect 
firefighters not to enter burning buildings, and to expect daughters to not 
look after their disabled and elderly mothers. Furthermore, we retain luck 
egalitarianismʼs feature of denying assistance in cases of imprudence, as we 
would not assist someone who camped on the side of an erupting volcano, 
or who burned themselves jumping through a ring of fire. The barrier for 
imprudence is effectively raised so that disadvantaged persons who have 
acted reasonably are not left to fend for themselves.
These cases suggest that there is strong intuitive support for the reasonable 
avoidability proposal. It may be a significant step in the right direction. 
Nevertheless, I have four comments which I believe should as a minimum 
motivate some refinement of the proposal.
First, as it is stated in the book, the reasonable avoidability proposal 
appears to be a black or white thing: some bad outcome either was reasonably 
avoidable, or it was not. While I can see that that might make application 
easier, in many cases this will have counterintuitive results. For instance, a 
known earthquake risk is something that is likely to affect real estate prices 
in parts of California. Someone may choose to move to one of these areas 
precisely because real estate prices are lower, while a more risk averse person 
may prefer to live somewhere with no history of earthquakes elsewhere on 
the West Coast and pay higher prices. If the less risk averse person sʼ home is 
then struck by an earthquake, it is wrong to say that this disaster was, for him, 
as unavoidable as a strike on the more risk averse person sʼ home would have 
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been for her. After all, the more risk averse person decided against taking the 
steps to avoid this kind of disaster that the less risk averse person took on. 
The fuzzy notion of reasonableness disguises the fact that there are various 
degrees of avoidability, with moral implications. Intuitively, and all else being 
equal, a disadvantage which was more avoidable should give entitlements to 
less assistance than a disadvantage which was less avoidable.
Second, Segall openly admits that “ ʻunreasonableness  ʼis an ambiguous 
notion, and that obviously has the weakness of leading to indeterminacy” (21). 
While he goes on to claim that “the formulationʼs ambiguity could be a source 
of strength” (22) I am not so convinced that an example advanced in support 
of this shows as much. Segall mentions that in some extreme circumstances, 
a one child policy similar to Chinaʼs might be a “reasonable one to pursue,” 
and so parents might not receive egalitarian assistance for having a child 
beyond the first (assuming the child was not in danger). While that does not 
strike me as a strange claim in general, I am not sure that it really follows 
from the reasonable avoidability criterion. The question is not whether the 
policy is reasonable but rather whether the parents could reasonably avoid 
the second or third child. To be sure, the legislative background is one thing 
that affects reasonable avoidability, but so too might deeply held cultural 
beliefs. Ambiguity might be an advantage in that it allows for changes in 
the legal backdrop, but it is a disadvantage where it requires distributions to 
be based on an assessment of whether it is reasonable to expect someone to 
act in accordance with the law even where that is both illiberally invasive 
of family life and contrary to religious conviction. It is hard to see how 
to make such an assessment without filling in ʻreasonable  ʼ with a fairly 
comprehensive account of morality – a huge task in itself.
Third, in other examples Segall interprets reasonable avoidability in ways 
that seem to commit it to injustice. For instance, where there is no especially 
strong connection between a caregiver and a cared-for family member, 
so that others might provide the treatment, the caregiving can be seen as 
praiseworthy but reasonably avoidable, and compensation denied in spite 
of the employment and socializing cost (23). This can perhaps be handled 
by appealing to the aforementioned ambiguity of reasonableness. It is not 
obvious to me that we have to say it is reasonable to expect someone to 
avoid caring for a relative even if alternative provision is available. More 
difficult is Segallʼs suggestion that, where a woman has been warned of 
medical complications should she become pregnant, “if she does opt for the 
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pregnancy, then it would not be unreasonable . . . to see her as forfeiting a claim 
to treatment on grounds of egalitarian distributive justice” (22). For some 
severity of complication, it surely would be unreasonable for this woman to 
choose to become pregnant, but I donʼt think that closes off our egalitarian 
concern with her plight. From a standard luck egalitarian perspective such 
a woman is entitled to treatment, for she is disadvantaged relative to other 
pregnant women on account of the brute bad luck of having this medical 
condition (assuming she has not caused her condition). This seems to be 
a counterexample to reasonable avoidability of comparable strength to the 
counterexamples to other forms of luck egalitarianism mentioned earlier. Of 
course, it is not decisive, but it does show that reasonable avoidability does 
not have all the intuitive phenomena its own way.
Finally, there is a cost associated with any use of reasonableness as a 
criterion for distribution. Describing his standard, prudential-choice form of 
luck egalitarianism, Arneson (1990, 176) makes this observation:
the judgment that it would be inappropriate to transfer resources to restore equality 
of welfare … need not involve any claim that the individuals making choices that 
generate inequality are behaving unreasonably. No imperative of practical reason 
commands us to maximize our personal welfare.
On conventional luck egalitarian views like this, those who are disadvantaged 
through their own actions are not thereby stigmatized as having failed to 
be reasonable, because it is not assumed that reasonable persons maximize 
their welfare. By contrast, Segall could be interpreted as saying that some 
people are not due compensation for their disadvantages because they fell 
short of what could be reasonable expected of them – they refused to avoid 
performing the action that has disadvantaged them even though they could 
be reasonably expected to avoid performing it. The reasonable avoidability 
criterion thereby appears to add insult to injury by telling the unassisted 
disadvantaged that they are to blame for the state they are in. This is a 
disadvantage relative to conventional luck egalitarianism, at least of the 
prudential sort, which does not have these moralizing implications. 
Healthcare
Segallʼs discussion of healthcare begins, appropriately enough, with a 
critique of Danielʼs Rawlsian account of just healthcare. It is claimed that, as 
Daniels  ʼaccount is motivated by FEOP for not just careers (as with Rawls) 
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but life plans (which include non-career projects), it has two unfortunate 
implications. First, since the rich will generally have greater opportunities 
than the poor, selective provision of healthcare such that only the poor 
receive it may be the best way of securing an overall equality of opportunity, 
contrary to the common thought that healthcare should be universally 
provided. The second and most distinctive part of Segallʼs contribution to 
criticism of Daniels  ʼwork is the suggestion that, as the elderly generally do 
not have life plans in the relevant sense, Daniels cannot justify healthcare 
for the elderly. 
I am not entirely convinced by this second move. It turns upon defining 
the relevant kind of life plan narrowly, so that “taking it easy once one retires 
and reading lots of novels” doesnʼt count as a life plan. This is justified 
on account of the fact that the Rawlsian FEOP guarantees (roughly) equal 
opportunities only for those of equal talent, and “talents – equal or not – do 
not come into play” in the broader, retirement-inclusive type of life plan 
(35). But talents of a certain sort surely do come into play when a retirement 
plan is being pursued. Clearly, more talented readers will be able to read 
more novels than less talented ones, and it might even be the case that those 
of a placid disposition will be better able to take it easy than livewires and 
worriers. While “these pursuits do not constitute competitive positions,” 
and so are “contrary to the rationale behind Rawlsʼs FEOP” (35), it does 
not take much of a leap to suppose that, as Daniels departs from Rawls 
in being concerned with projects such as publishing a non-profit book of 
oneʼs poems, he must allow that some life plans are distributed according to 
FEOP despite being noncompetitive. Indeed, Segall says that the extension 
of FEOP to cover not just careers but also life plans is justifiable on the 
basis that “major rewards also follow from pursuing the type of life plan we 
choose to lead” (34), and this basis makes no reference to competitiveness. 
Although I am not entirely convinced by Segallʼs critique of the Rawlsian 
approach to healthcare, he does certainly push that approach to its limits, 
critically engaging with Daniels on Daniels  ʼterms.
The value of the discussion of democratic equality, the other ʻ responsibility-
insensitive  ʼaccount of healthcare considered in chapter 2, is rather different, 
in that this is one of the first attempts to draw an account of healthcare out 
of a view mostly developed (at least in its recent ʻresurfaced  ʼ[37] form) in 
response to luck egalitarianism by writers such as Elizabeth Anderson and 
Samuel Scheffler. The shape of the criticism is different also, with the focus 
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of the numerous objections being not the internal consistency of the view 
but rather its inconsistency with considered moral judgments. One objection 
of note is the suggestion that, as democratic equality is just concerned with 
providing a distribution of goods sufficient for equal citizenship, equal 
involvement in civil society, and protection from oppression, it is contingent 
on the presence of certain social and political forms. Segall specifically says 
that, where there is no democratic regime in place, healthcare will receive 
no justification on democratic egalitarian grounds (41), but I think other 
conditions might also have to be satisfied – for instance, that there is neither 
a (nondemocratic) civil society nor any risk of oppression that might be 
averted by medical assistance. Even revised in this way, the objection is a 
powerful one.
Finding responsibility-insensitive accounts wanting, Segall moves on 
to consider a position he terms ʻall-luck egalitarianismʼ. Rather than just 
correcting the effects of brute luck, as standard luck egalitarianism does, this 
view corrects the effects of both brute luck and option luck. Even where an 
individual is responsible for (or could not have reasonably avoided) taking 
on some risk, it is, on this view, appropriate for the effects of that risk to 
be pooled among all persons taking similar risks, so that the ʻlosers  ʼ (for 
example, smokers who develop cancer) receive healthcare at the expense of 
the ʻwinners  ʼ(for example, relatively healthy smokers). Segall argues that 
this view, applied consistently, would counterintuitively prohibit gambles 
and, worse, permit a form of levelling down, as the perceived unfair 
inequality between winners and losers could just as well be met by lowering 
the well-being of the ʻwinnersʼ.
I feel the attraction of all-luck egalitarianism, and believe Segall is a little 
quick with it. In chapter 8, in response to a similar levelling down objection, 
Segall defends a form of luck egalitarianism that endorses prioritarianism 
(that is, the view that priority should be given to the worst off in absolute 
terms) rather than strict egalitarianism (which reduces relative variations in 
advantage). It therefore seems unfair not to consider a prioritarian form of 
all-luck egalitarianism that sees the unfairness between option luck winners 
and losers as issuing in the fact that the results of the option luck are not 
distributed to the maximal benefit of the worst off risk takers. That thought 
notwithstanding, chapter 3 is one of the best of the book, shedding light on a 
very recent but widespread trend in egalitarian political philosophy that has 
largely gone unnoticed.
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With the critique of rival approaches complete, Segall is in a position to 
describe and defend his own approach to justice in healthcare. First he seeks 
to establish pluralism as a viable weapon in the luck egalitarian arsenal, 
and then weds luck egalitarianism to the view that basic needs must not 
go unmet. This latter move is intended as a response to the ʻabandonment 
objection  ʼraised by Anderson, Scheffler, and others, which holds that luck 
egalitarianism unfairly leaves those who are severely disadvantaged through 
their own actions (such as driving recklessly, without insurance) to their fates. 
I have to admit to a certain disappointment that, in a work that fine tunes 
luck egalitarianism in such ways as associating brute luck with the absence 
of reasonable avoidability and replacing its strictly egalitarian component 
with a prioritarian one, and which considers such nuanced luck egalitarian 
responses to the problem of some peopleʼs basic needs going unmet as all-
luck egalitarianism, the ultimate solution to that problem is simply to add to 
luck egalitarianism a principle requiring that basic needs always be met. As 
Cohen (1989, 921) comments upon using ʻsemitheory  ʼto describe his own 
luck egalitarian account, “it is perhaps too close to the intuitive phenomena 
to merit the name ʻtheory.ʼ ” 
I am also very far from convinced by the claim that “the abandonment 
objection points to the sort of case . . . where luck egalitarian distributive 
justice is indeterminate” (65). Where agents are responsible for their 
(reasonably avoidable) joyride and seriously injure themselves, it is 
uncontroversial that they are disadvantaged on account of option luck and 
that luck egalitarianism therefore prohibits assisting them at societyʼs expense 
in the name of distributive justice. The argument for Segallʼs position seems 
to be the argument in chapter 1, according to which brute luck equality, such 
as that between a joyrider who has been treated at public expense and a non-
joyrider, is not unjust, but I hope to have shown earlier that this is contrary to 
luck egalitarianism. In chapter 4 Segall does make the interesting point that 
distributive justice is only part of justice, and justice only part of morality, 
but that does not at all go to show that there is something internal to luck 
egalitarian distributive justice that makes it indeterminate in its treatment of 
option luck. If, as Segall holds, luck egalitarian justice is part of morality, 
and all-things-considered morality requires us to assist the needy negligent, 
that must be because some other part of morality trumps or outweighs the 
very determinate judgment of luck egalitarianism to disregard the needy 
negligent. In one place Segall appears to get this right by writing that “the 
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concern for basic needs . . . overrides luck egalitarian distributive justice” 
(76). This less ambitious claim has a much firmer footing.
The fifth and final chapter of part I aims to show how Segallʼs luck 
egalitarian account can defend a universal system of healthcare. Such a 
system is universal not just in providing treatment to all those who require it, 
but also in preventing potential patients from exchanging their entitlement to 
free medical treatment for a cash equivalent. This second sense of universal 
has obvious importance to proponents of universal healthcare schemes, for 
without it important sources of funding – those who prefer private healthcare 
or no healthcare at all – are lost. Segall argues that even the welfare luck 
egalitarian will not allow the ill to opt out and claim the cash equivalent 
as “someone who is ill due to bad luck is entitled thereby to have that bad 
luck reversed through medical treatment. She does not, in contrast, have 
an entitlement to the cash equivalent of what it takes to neutralize that bad 
luck disadvantage” (85). While this is true so far as it goes, it does not really 
establish that persons may never trade medical aid for cash. A welfare luck 
egalitarian is only concerned with illness insofar as it is a welfare deficit for 
which the victim is not responsible (or could not have reasonably avoided), 
and luck egalitarianism does not limit itself to alleviating that deficit 
through medical means. If giving the ill person cash will more assuredly 
or comprehensively correct their welfare deficit than medical treatment, 
then I do not see how the luck egalitarian can insist upon medical treatment. 
Prohibiting this kind of medical opt out would amount to leaving some 
easily neutralizable brute bad luck untouched. Even so, the discussion of 
the normative underpinnings of this significant but underexplored aspect of 
universality has many merits, not least the demonstration that Daniels  ʼview 
is, on account of its extension of FEOP to include life plans, unable to resist 
the provision of a Stradivarius to a keen violinist, though this might come at 
the cost of their mobility.
One distinctively luck egalitarian feature of the discussion of the first, 
provision-based universality is that it mandates passing part of the cost of 
meeting basic needs to imprudent patients. While this feature is itself clearly 
luck egalitarian in nature, I find it curious that Segall believes the best 
application of this feature is ex ante, as where insurance for risky activities 
is compulsory. The chapter does not seem to address the objection that this 
would make not only the needy negligent, but also the non-needy negligent, 
pay for treating the needy negligent. Of course, from an all-luck egalitarian 
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perspective, that is an attractive outcome, but on the more standard luck 
egalitarian view that constitutes treating the non-needy negligent unfairly, 
as they have to pay for other peopleʼs bad option luck. Noting the similarity 
with all-luck egalitarian policy proposals, Segall comments that “the 
justification offered is considerably different” (75), but the only justifications 
advanced seem to be the practical advantages that it is easier to make ex 
ante insurance progressive on wealth, that patients will not be deterred from 
receiving treatment where they have already paid, and that medical staff 
are separated from decisions about culpability where payments are already 
taken (77–78). Desirable as it is for patients to choose to be treated, it is hard 
to see why luck egalitarianism would prefer that they make that choice, and 
it would take no great ingenuity to design an ex post system of payments 
administered by non-medical staff and progressive on wealth – for instance, 
one especially focused on skiing-related injuries. Even taken together these 
advantages surely can not, from a luck egalitarian perspective, outweigh the 
huge disadvantage of effectively taxing a large number of persons (all non-
seriously injured skiers in a season, say) with good option luck in order to 
assist a much smaller number of persons (the broken boned minority) with 
bad option luck. 
Segall may be able to respond by suggesting that this transfer will 
tend towards creating outcome equality, and a brute luck equality such as 
this is no worse than an option luck inequality on his view. But this would 
still not explain why we were targeting risk-takers for ex ante payments. 
From Segallʼs non–all luck perspective, skiers who do not injure themselves 
are no more liable than non-skiers to compensate skiers who do injure 
themselves. If the benefit of ex ante transfers is the creation of equality, we 
can better achieve that goal by making ex ante transfers from everybody, 
not just from risk-takers. It is true that Segall may still be able to defend 
compulsory ex ante insurance for risky activities – and, indeed, the prohibition 
on cash compensation for opting out – by reference to other values, but 
insofar as that is successful, it is in spite of luck egalitarianism, not because 
of it.
Concluding Remarks
Health, Luck, and Justice is not only the only monograph on luck egalitarian 
approaches to health policy, but also one of the very best sustained studies 
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of the contribution political philosophy can make to bioethics. Segall has, I 
believe, established luck egalitarianism as a contender among approaches 
to health and healthcare, while contributing to our understanding of luck 
egalitarianism itself in, for example, his suggestion that disadvantages which 
were not reasonably avoidable should be compensable, and his analysis of 
all-luck egalitarianism.
One remaining and quite general comment I have is that the book 
does surprisingly little to mount a positive case for a distinctively luck 
egalitarian approach to healthcare, but rather mostly focuses on showing 
that luck egalitarianism is not subject to the common criticism that, in taking 
individual responsibility as central, it takes a right-wing stance that is blind 
to social injustice. In the conclusion Segall says that, if his account “is in 
any way attractive, then it may provide luck egalitarians with a response” 
to this criticism (174). There is much effort put into showing that luck 
egalitarianism can handle cases of medical need in the way suggested by 
traditional left-wing thinking, but little is said to show the distinctive benefits 
of luck egalitarianism as an approach to distributing healthcare. For instance, 
I think the fact that luck egalitarianism will make those who are responsible 
for (unavoidably) putting themselves in harmʼs way pay for the resulting 
medical treatment, where they can afford it, makes luck egalitarianism more 
morally appealing than more conventional liberal views such as Daniels  ʼ
and Andersonʼs, which allow risk-takers to indulge in moral hostage-taking 
(see Keller 2002). Similarly, luck egalitarianismʼs willingness to assign 
scarce organs to those who are not responsible for damaging their original 
ones in preference to those who are so responsible seems to me to make 
luck egalitarianism more morally plausible than views which will disregard 
culpability, even where it is not in dispute, and even where a tie-breaking 
criterion is needed. Positive arguments of this sort are not advanced in the 
book, though something like the first seems to be assumed in chapter 5. 
In fairness, it may be that Segall, like many writers, is simply not so hard-
nosed on individual responsibility, and is willing to give the values that run 
counter to these luck egalitarian ideas a more prominent role in his pluralistic 
position than they have in my view (see Knight 2009, chap. 6). In other 
words, he may think that some of what I call distinctive advantages of luck 
egalitarianism are not really advantages at all, and possibly even excesses 
that need to be curbed. It should also be said that, when Segall moves away 
from healthcare in the second half of the book, the distinctive appeals of 
4 Knight layout.indd   87 12/23/10   11:40:12 AM
88   Carl Knight
luck egalitarianism as an approach to health simpliciter – for instance, as 
providing a rationale for distribution of enhancements to full normal health 
(chapter 9) and as mandating assistance to those with the brute bad luck of 
being born in poor and unhealthy nations (chapter 11) – are brought out very 
nicely indeed. It may be that, on Segallʼs view, the positive advantages of 
luck egalitarianism become apparent where it is applied to the more radical 
enterprise of distributing health.
Although I approached the book with a broadly similar (that is pluralistic 
luck egalitarian) stance to Segallʼs, I found the arguments took many 
unexpected turns, though never in such a way as to leave me lost. Any 
political philosopher or bioethicist will come away from the book knowing 
much more about both luck egalitarianism and philosophical approaches to 
health and healthcare. 
University of Glasgow and University of Johannesburg
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